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GALEN’S TELEOLOGY AND FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATION 
MARK SCHIEFSKY 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The importance of functional analysis in contemporary biology and social science is 
widely recognized. By functional analysis I mean an approach in which the parts of a 
complex system are studied in order to determine their contribution to the continued 
existence or operation of the system as a whole. Thus we may say that the function of the 
heart in an organism is to circulate the blood, and in doing so we identify the contribution 
of the heart to the organism’s continued existence.1 When we cite the function of an organ 
such as the heart to explain its presence or its distinctive structure we are giving a 
functional explanation, and such an explanation will involve teleological language. Why 
does the heart have four chambers and a set of precisely fitting valves? In order to fulfill its 
function of circulating the blood. The status of such functional explanations is a major 
concern in contemporary philosophy of science, in which key issues include the precise 
understanding of terms such as ‘function’, the possibility of reformulating functional 
explanations in non-teleological language, and the question whether the prevalence of 
functional explanations in biology and the social sciences reflects inherent differences 
between those disciplines and the physical sciences. The question ‘what functions explain’ 
is a matter of ongoing debate.2  
Whatever position one takes on these foundational issues, there seem to be at least two 
major reasons why functional analysis is important in the study of living things. (1) First, 
organisms have capacities for self-maintenance and reproduction, and these capacities 
imply a certain plasticity of behavior. That is, whatever the changes in the environment, a 
living organism will behave in ways that promote its own survival and reproduction. Since 2 
the organism consistently engages in these activities despite changes in the environment, it 
is natural to take the activities as basic explananda and to inquire into the roles of the 
various parts in promoting them. (2) Moreover, living things are organic wholes whose 
parts interact with one another in complex ways; organisms are not systems of 
independently functioning parts. As Nagel put it, the parts of the organism are ‘internally 
related’; they ‘mutually influence one another, and their behavior regulates and is 
regulated by the activities of the organism as a whole’.3 For these reasons, among others, 
functional explanations are prevalent in contemporary biology. Such explanations, of 
course, do not imply any reference to animate agents; to say that the heart is structured in a 
certain way in order to circulate the blood is not to say that an intelligent agent designed it 
for this purpose, intended it to do so, or makes it circulate the blood.  
The aim of this paper is to argue that Galen adopted a functional approach to the study 
of living organisms and that he did so for reasons similar to those that have just been 
described. Galen’s method in works such as On the Use of the Parts (De usu partium, UP) 
and On the Natural Faculties (De naturalibus facultatibus, Nat. fac.)4 reflects a keen 
awareness of the complexity of the ways in which the parts of the body work together to 
promote activities such as self-maintenance and reproduction. The basic idea that governs 
his approach in UP is that the existence, structure, and attributes of all the parts must be 
explained by reference to their functions in promoting the activities of the whole organism; 
this means that functions have an ineliminable role in the explanation of the parts.  
In UP and other works, Galen describes the construction of the human body as the 
result of the effort of a supremely intelligent and powerful divine Craftsman or Demiurge, 
who exerts foresight or providence (pronoia) on behalf of living things. Galen also 
frequently attributes the construction of the body to a personified nature or physis, which is 
said to be ‘craftsmanlike’ (technikē), i.e. capable of art or craft (technē). Galen was 
obviously committed to the view that the structure of the body is a result of intelligent 3 
design. To argue that Galen’s Demiurge is only a device of exposition would be going too 
far, and that is not my claim. Nevertheless Galen’s descriptions of the ways in which the 
Demiurge devised the structure of the human body reflect a highly sophisticated, 
functional analysis of the organism, and there are good reasons to adopt such an approach 
that are independent of belief in a divine artificer. Sections 2-5 below describe the 
background and main features of Galen’s functional approach; I return to the question of 
the relationship between functions and design in section 6. 
  
2. Aristotle 
Although the Hippocratic writings of the fifth and fourth centuries BC are rich in 
descriptions of the human body and its parts, the first thinker to apply functional analysis 
consistently to the study of living things is Aristotle.5 I therefore begin with a brief account 
of his methodology, based largely on the De anima (An.) and De partibus animalium 
(PA).6 For Aristotle, what distinguishes the living from the lifeless is the possession of soul, 
viewed as the source of a set of ‘powers’ or ‘faculties’ (dynameis) to engage in activities 
such as nutrition, reproduction, appetite, perception, locomotion, and thought (An. 
413a20-b13, 414a29-32). The most basic faculty of the soul is that of self-nutrition and 
reproduction; it is common to all living things, and so also serves to distinguish the living 
from the lifeless (An. 412a13-15, 415a23-b3, 415b26-8, 416b17-20). All other faculties of 
the soul, such as perception, locomotion, and thought, presuppose the capacity for 
nutrition (i.e. self-maintenance) and reproduction (An. 415a1-13). In identifying self-
maintenance and reproduction as the distinctive activities of living things, Aristotle focuses 
on the tendency of organisms to respond to the environment in ways that promote their 
own survival. The growth of plants is not explained by reference to the natural tendencies 
of fire to move upward and earth downward; rather, plants grow in a way that is directed at 
maintaining their existence, and it is because of this that they count as alive (An. 413a25-4 
31; cf. 415b28-416a9). Since survival and reproduction are the most fundamental activities 
of living things, we must take them as the starting point of explanation and investigate the 
ways in which the organism is able to perform them. 
The same issues are approached from a slightly different angle in the opening chapters 
of the De partibus animalium (PA 1.1-1.5). A major theme in this work is the idea that the 
parts of an organism can only be understood with reference to the whole; in other words, 
the whole organism is prior to its parts in the order of explanation. The processes that go 
on during embryonic development make up a complex, interrelated progression whose 
order is only intelligible from the point of view of the resulting organism, just as in the case 
of housebuilding, the steps in the process make sense only in reference to the finished 
house. Explanations of development must therefore begin with a specification of the form 
(eidos) or definition (logos) of the finished product or organism (PA 1.1, 640a33-b4). In 
PA 1.5 Aristotle explains the implications of this kind of approach for the study of the parts 
of the fully-developed organism: 
  
Since every instrument [organon] is for the sake of something [ἕνεκά του], 
each of the parts of the body is for the sake of something, and since that for the 
sake of which they exist is some activity [πρᾶξις], it is clear that also the whole 
body is constituted for the sake of some complex activity [πράξεώς τινος 
ἕνεκα πολυμεροῦς]. For the sawing does not come about for the sake of the 
saw, but the saw for the sake of sawing, because sawing is a use [χρῆσις]. 
Hence also the body is in a certain way for the sake of the soul, and the parts for 
the sake of the functions [erga] for which each of them is naturally constituted 
[πρὸς ἃ πέφυκεν ἕκαστον]. First, then, we must state the activities [πράξεις] 
common to all, then those which belong to a genus and a species. (PA 1.5, 
645b14-22) 5 
 
Just as the saw exists ‘for the sake of’ sawing, so the body exists ‘for the sake’ of the soul 
and its characteristic activities. The basic idea is the adaptation of structure to function. 
The saw is constructed in such a way as to make it good for sawing, just as any tool or 
instrument is made to perform its function well; similarly, the parts of the body, and the 
body as a whole, are constructed in such a way as to perform the activities (πράξεις) of the 
soul. All the parts contribute to the achievement of a particular set of activities which make 
up an intelligible pattern, the characteristic life of the organism; in this sense, they exist ‘for 
the sake of’ these activities. Once again the method is clear: we must begin with an 
enumeration of the organism’s activities, then go on to consider the parts that enable it to 
perform them. 
Aristotle consistently describes the parts of the organism as ‘instruments’ or organs 
(organa) distinguished by their ‘works’ or ‘functions’ (erga), i.e. the contributions they 
make to the organism’s characteristic activities. What makes the eye an eye is its capacity to 
see, just as an axe is defined by its capacity to chop; an eye without the capacity to see is an 
eye only in name (An. 412b9-22).7 In many cases, the function (ergon) of a part will be its 
contribution to the organism’s self-maintenance or reproduction. Some organs, however, 
are present in order to make life better, not just to make it possible. Thus the kidney, for 
example, exists to improve the functioning of the bladder, and the senses other than touch 
are present ‘not for the sake of being, but for well-being’.8 In every case, however, the 
functions are understood as contributions to the organism’s characteristic activities. And, 
crucially, the analysis stops there: Aristotle does not conceive of organisms or their parts as 
having functions in some larger order or system.9 
A final important aspect of Aristotle’s conception of the organism is the notion of 
functional organization, the ways in which the parts work together to promote the activities 
of the whole. In the De motu animalium (703a29-b2) he compares the organism to a well-6 
governed city in which each part performs its allotted function (ergon). But it is not as 
though the function of each of the parts can be specified independently of the others. The 
organism is a system in which the parts interact with one another to produce results that 
are beneficial for the whole. Respiration, for example, occurs when the lungs expand due 
to the increase in innate heat caused by the process of nutrition. But the function of 
respiration is to cool the innate heat, and thus to enable the organism’s continued self-
maintenance and nutrition (De respiratione 474a25-b24 and 480a16-b20). In this way the 
functions of the organs of respiration (the lungs) and of the innate heat (the heart) are 
interdependent. 
Four interconnected features of Aristotle’s approach have emerged from this brief 
survey: (1) the fundamental importance of self-maintenance and reproduction; (2) the 
explanatory priority of the whole organism to its parts; (3) the emphasis on the functions of 
the parts, understood as their contributions to the organism’s activities; (4) the notion of 
functional organization and the interdependence of the various organs. Let us now turn to 
Galen and see how these features are reflected in his approach. 
 
3. An Aristotelian approach 
Like Aristotle, Galen identifies self-maintenance and reproduction as the fundamental 
activities of living things. In Nat. fac. Galen conceives of the organism’s physis or ‘nature’ 
as an entity responsible for managing (διοικεῖν) activities which do not involve cognition or 
voluntary motion, such as growth and nutrition; cognition and voluntary motion, by 
contrast, are assigned to the soul (psychē) rather than nature. Plants have a nature but not 
a soul, reflecting the status of self-maintenance and reproduction as marking off the living 
from the lifeless (Nat. fac. 1.1, 101.1-15 H, 2.1-2 K).10 The investigation of physis begins 
from an enumeration of its characteristic ‘works’ (erga) and ‘activities’ (energeiai); to each 
activity there corresponds a particular faculty (dynamis) as its cause (aitia). Galen explains 7 
that ‘works’ (erga) refers primarily to products, such as flesh, blood, and bone, while 
‘activities’ refers to processes or, more specifically, ‘active changes’ (δραστικαὶ κινήσεις). 
The scope of ergon is wider than energeia, since all activites (e.g. digestion or blood-
production) can be considered products, but not all products (e.g. flesh, blood, bone) are 
activities (Nat. fac. 1.2, 105.13-106.3 H, 2.6-7 K; 1.4, 107.20-24 H, 2.10 K). The most 
fundamental activities of physis are those that make possible the organism’s continued 
existence and promote its development: generation (γένεσις), growth (αὔξησις), and 
nutrition (θρέψις). Galen emphasizes both the interdependence of these activities and their 
contribution to the organism’s self-maintenance. The faculty of generation is responsible 
for the formation of the organism in the womb, that of growth for its development to full 
size once born, and that of nutrition for its continued existence. Generation is 
‘compounded’ (σύνθετος) from alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) and shaping (διάπλασις) (Nat. 
fac. 1.5, 107.24-108.20 H, 2.10-11 K). The faculties of growth and nutrition are present in 
the embryo, but only as ‘handmaids’ (ὑπηρέτιδες) to the generative faculty; from the time 
of birth until the organism reaches its full size, the faculty of growth is dominant, while 
alteration and nutrition are its ‘handmaids’ (Nat. fac. 1.7, 112.6-15 H, 2.16 K). 
Once the various activities and their interrelationships have been analyzed, Galen turns 
to an examination of the organs that perform them. Nutrition, defined as ‘assimilation of 
that which nourishes to that which is nourished’ (ὁμοίωσις τοῦ τρέφοντος τῷ 
τρεφομένῳ), requires organs which alter food so that it can be assimilated, others which 
dispose of the inevitable residues formed during this process, and still others which convey 
the nutriment through the body; a large number of organs will be needed to perform these 
activities, and the investigation should begin from those those are most closely related to 
the end (telos) to be achieved, i.e. nutrition (Nat. fac. 1.10, 117.17-118.2 H, 2.23-4 K; 
1.11, 118.7-8 H, 2.24 K). In this way the investigation of the principal activities of physis 
leads directly to the investigation of the parts of the body and their activities. 8 
Just as Nat. fac. takes off from the De anima, so the De usu partium picks up from the 
De partibus animalium.11 After a brief introductory paragraph setting out the notion of a 
part as that which is neither totally distinct from nor entirely fused with its surroundings, 
Galen continues with a statement that is of fundamental significance for understanding his 
method throughout the work:  
 
The use [chreia] of all of them [sc. the parts] is for the soul. For the body is its 
instrument [organon], and for this reason, the parts of animals differ greatly from one 
another, because their souls also differ. For some are brave and others timid; some are 
wild and others tame; and some are, so to speak, political and craftsmanlike [πολιτικά 
τε καὶ δημιουργικά], whereas others are, as it were, asocial. But for all of them, the 
body is suited to the character [ἤθεα] and faculties [dynameis] of the soul. (UP 1.2, 
1.1.13-2.2 H, 3.2 K) 
  
Like Aristotle, Galen identifies the body as the ‘instrument’ (organon) of the soul, the tool 
that enables it to carry out its characteristic activities. The body and its parts are for the 
sake of the soul, in the sense that they are adapted to the performance of the organism’s 
activities. If one is to understand why an organism has the parts it does, it is necessary to 
have knowledge of its characteristic activities, as expressed in the ‘character and faculties’ 
of its soul. Galen elaborates by considering the appropriateness of various creatures’ bodies 
to their souls: the lion is strong and fearless and has teeth and claws to match, while the 
timid deer has a body that is sleek but also defenseless (UP 1.2, 1.2.2-11 H, 3.2-3 K). 
Human beings, though they lack defensive organs, make up for this by the possession of 
hands; with these they construct tools to compensate for their natural inferiority to animals 
in qualities such as speed and strength (UP 1.2, 1.2.11-3.24 H, 3.3-5 K). Galen goes on to 
praise Aristotle for rejecting Anaxagoras’ suggestion that human beings are intelligent 9 
because they possess hands; rather, they possess hands because they are intelligent (UP 1.3, 
1.4.2-5 H, 3.5 K; cf. Arist. PA 687a7-23). In all of this the underlying idea, as in Aristotle, is 
the explanatory priority of the whole organism to its parts. The organism’s activities are not 
explained by reference to its parts; rather, the parts are explained by reference to the total 
pattern of the organism’s activities, as expressed in the character and faculties of its soul. 
Like Aristotle, Galen conceives of all the parts as existing for the sake of three primary 
ends: life, a better life, and reproduction.12 Furthermore the Galenic body, as well as being 
the ‘instrument’ of the soul, is also a collection of instruments or organs (organa) which are 
distinguished from one another by their activities (energeiai). What makes an organ an 
organ, as opposed to just a ‘part’ (morion), is its ability to perform an activity. Thus the eye 
is both an organ and a part, since it is a functional system that produces a single activity, 
sight; on the other hand the retina and the cornea are parts (both of the eye and, 
secondarily, of the face) but not organs.13 Galen indicates his indebtedness to Aristotle for 
his functional conception of the organs, and is if anything more strict than Aristotle in 
insisting that organs must be identified in purely functional terms. He often remarks in UP 
that organs should be named according to their activities rather than their visible structure 
or form, and criticizes Aristotle for failing to do so.14 
As an example of Galen’s functional approach we may consider his discussion of the 
human hand in De usu partium 1.8-10. These chapters set out what Galen describes as a 
general method for determining the ‘use’ (chreia) of any part — a problem which, he says, 
had led to extensive disagreement among doctors and philosophers alike (UP 1.8, 1.12.13-
19 H, 3.17 K). Galen takes his start from a cryptic remark found in the Hippocratic text 
On Nutriment (Alim.), a work which is now generally considered to reflect Stoic influence, 
but which for Galen was a key source of genuine Hippocratic doctrine: 
 10 
Taken as a whole, all in sympathy, but taken severally, the parts in each part for its 
work [ergon].15 (UP 1.8, 1.12.24-5 H, 3.17 K = Hp. Alim. 23, 9.106 Littré) 
 
Galen offers a typically creative exegesis of this remark, which he says ‘is rather obscure for 
most people because it is written in the archaic style and with his [sc. Hippocrates’] 
customary conciseness’: 
 
All the parts of the body are in sympathy with one another, that is to say, all cooperate 
[ὁμολογεῖ] in producing one work [ergon]. The large parts, main divisions of the 
whole animal, such as the hands, feet, eyes, and tongue, came to be for the sake of the 
activities [energeiai] of the animal as a whole and all cooperate in performing them 
[πρὸς ταύτας ... ὁμολογεῖ]. But the smaller parts, the components of the parts I 
have mentioned, have reference to the work [ergon] of the whole organ. The eye, for 
example, is the instrument of sight, composed of many parts which all cooperate 
[ὁμολογοῦντα] in one work [ergon], vision; it has some parts by means of which we 
see, others without which sight would be impossible, others for the sake of better 
vision, and still others to protect all these. This, moreover, is also true of all the other 
parts. (UP 1.8, 1.13.7-20 H, 2.18-19 K) 
 
As Galen has it, ‘Hippocrates’ is remarking on the way which the parts of the body work 
together or ‘cooperate’ (ὁμολογεῖν) to produce the characteristic activities (energeiai) of 
the organism.16 First there are the larger parts such as the hand or eyes, which have come 
to be for the sake of the activities (energeiai) of the body as a whole, and cooperate 
(ὁμολογεῖ) with one another in bringing them about. But each individual organ such as 
the eye is also composed of many component parts, and these also cooperate (ὁμολογεῖ) 
towards producing the work (ergon) of the entire organ: the eye has some parts ‘through 
which’ (δι’ ὧν) we see, others for the sake of seeing better, others as necessary conditions 11 
of seeing, and still others for protection. Knowledge of the activities (energeiai) of the 
various organs (organa) is thus essential for understanding the uses (chreiai) of the parts, 
their beneficial contributions to the organism’s activities. In the case of the hand, Galen 
claims, it is evident that its work (ergon) is grasping; but earlier thinkers have failed to 
understand the way in which all its parts have been constructed with a view towards 
performing this activity (UP 1.8, 1.13.22-14.2 H, 3.19 K). In the case of many other organs 
the ergon is not at all clear, and this explains many of the errors that have been made 
concerning the uses (chreiai) of the parts (UP 1.8, 1.14.9-13 H, 3.19-20 K). In sum, when 
studying the uses of the parts, activity or energeia is ‘the starting point [ἀρχή] of 
investigation and the criterion [κριτήριον] of what is discovered’ (UP 1.10, 1.20.2-4 H, 
3.27 K). 
There is much more to be said about the distinction between ‘use’ (chreia) and 
‘activity’ (energeia), and I will return to this in the next section. But it should now be clear 
that the coordinated activity of the various organs was a major factor that motivated 
Galen’s functional approach to the body. The organs all work together to enable the 
organism to perform its characteristic activities, just as the parts of each organ work 
together to enable it to function normally. As in Aristotle, more is involved than just a high 
level of structural organization. The major organs and bodily systems not only work 
together towards the maintenance of the whole; they also depend on one another and 
influence one another’s behavior. In On the Formation of the Embryo Galen claims that 
while the parts can perform their activities (energeiai) independently of one another, they 
depend on ‘assistance’ (ἐπικουρία) from one another for their continued operation; this is 
because the substance of the parts is constantly changing in both quantity and quality (De 
foetuum formatione 5, 88.13-21 Nickel, 4.684 K). He goes on to describe the 
interdependence of the three most important organs of the body, the brain, heart, and 
liver: 12 
 
Now the heart (which some believe to be solely responsible for managing [διοικεῖν] 
the animal) when deprived of breathing ceases its motion, and with it the whole animal 
dies. It is deprived of breathing not just in cases of strangulation or when the path for 
inhalation is shut off due to inflammation of the parts around the larynx, but also when 
the nerves that move the chest are damaged (whether by cutting, crushing, or ligation), 
the spinal cord being the source of all these nerves, and the brain in turn of it. So just as 
the brain is useful [χρήσιμος] to the heart in order for the latter to sustain itself [εἰς 
τὴν διαμονήν] — it moves the chest through the nerves, and it is by expansion of the 
chest that inhalation takes place and by contraction, exhalation — in the same way, the 
heart provides a use [chreia] to the brain and the liver to both of these, as has been 
shown in the accounts of these matters. But it is not only these three principal organs 
[ἀρχαί] that are helped by one another; this is characteristic of all the other parts as 
well. For the present, let a single reminder suffice of all the other individual points that 
were made in On the Use of the Parts. (De foetuum formatione 5, 88.25-90.7 Nickel, 
4.685 K) 
 
The activity of the heart depends on the brain, but the heart also serves the brain as the 
source of the arteries, which maintain the innate heat and nourish the psychic pneuma. 
The liver serves both heart and brain, but it is also dependent on them for its continued 
activity.17 The analysis of major bodily systems thus involves a kind of feedback in which 
each both sustains and is sustained by the others. Evidently Galen considers this kind of 
functional interdependence to be one of the essential points of the De usu partium.18 
 
4. Use and activity 13 
One way in which Galen goes beyond anything found in Aristotle’s biological works is 
in developing a systematic distinction between the notions of ‘use’ (chreia) and ‘activity’ 
(energeia).19 At the beginning of the last book of the De usu partium, Galen offers his most 
explicit characterization of this distinction:  
 
Now the activity [energeia] of a part differs from its use [chreia], as I have said before, 
because activity is active change and use is the same as what is commonly called utility 
[εὐχρηστία]. I have said that activity is active change because many changes occur 
passively [κατὰ πάθος], and indeed they are called ‘passive’ [παθητικαί] — all those 
which occur in things when other things change them. (UP 17.1, 2.437.8-15 H, 4.346-
7 K) 
 
The idea of energeia as a specifically active (δραστικός) change or motion (kinēsis) is one 
that can be paralleled in other Galenic works, where we also find the contrast with ‘passive’ 
(παθητική) change arising from an external source; it is clear in these passages that kinēsis 
covers both change of quality and change of place or local motion. Thus when food 
becomes blood this is a passive change of the food but an active change of the veins; 
similarly when the muscles move the limbs, the motion of the muscles is active and that of 
the limbs passive.20 Galen’s extensive deployment of energeia and its correlate dynamis 
obviously reflects the pervasive influence of Aristotle on Greek medical and biological 
thought, though the extent to which his use of these concepts is genuinely Aristotelian is 
not immediately clear.21 
The remark that chreia is equivalent to ‘what is commonly called utility (εὐχρηστία)’ 
is the closest Galen comes to defining the term in UP. LSJ gives a wide range of meanings, 
including ‘need’, ‘want’, ‘use’, ‘advantage’, and ‘service’, and examples of all these senses 
can be found in the hundreds of instances of chreia in UP.22 Despite this variation, 14 
however, the basic idea expressed by chreia in a large number of passages is that of a 
beneficial contribution to the organism’s characteristic activities, especially self-
maintenance and reproduction. The importance of a part is judged by its chreia, its 
beneficial contribution to the organism’s life:  
 
This can be decided in both cases by the use [chreia]. But since there are three 
kinds of use — either for life itself [εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν], or for living well [εἰς τὸ 
καλῶς ζῆν], or for preserving the race [εἰς τὴν τοῦ γένους φυλακήν] ...  
(UP 6.7, 1.318.8-11 H, 3.435 K) 
 
Again we have the Aristotelian tripartite schema: all the parts contribute to life, 
reproduction, or the improvement of life.23 Insofar as chreia refers primarily to the 
beneficial contribution of the parts rather than to their ‘suitability’ or ‘fitness’ to make such 
contributions, the translation ‘use’ is preferable to ‘utility’ or ‘usefulness’.24 
Understood in this way, chreia is clearly distinct from energeia understood as ‘active 
change’. Galen writes of the chreiai of energeiai, where what is in question is the 
contribution of the active motion or change in question to the organism’s life. For example, 
the energeia of the arteries is their active, pulsating motion, caused by the ‘pulsative 
faculty’ (σφυγμικὴ δύναμις) transmitted by the heart through the arterial coats; but the 
chreia of this activity is the preservation of the vital heat and nourishing of the psychic 
pneuma.25 Where a part does have an activity of its own, its principal contribution to the 
organism’s life will be made through that activity. An example of this is the elephant’s 
trunk: Galen says he thought it was useless and superfluous until he saw the elephant 
performing many useful actions with it; in this case ‘the use of the part is bound up with the 
usefulness of the activity’.26 Nevertheless, the concepts of chreia and energeia remain 15 
distinct. The chreia of some parts consists in providing security or the necessary conditions 
for activities, or in making it possible for them to be performed better.27  
The distinction between use and activity is also reflected on the methodological level. 
The investigation of energeiai involves the attempt to discern the specific causes of motions 
or changes in the parts, e.g. whether the pulsation of the arteries is caused by a faculty 
(dynamis) transmitted by the heart through the arterial coats or by the heart acting as a 
pump.28 Since Galen holds that a part’s activity depends on the character of the substance 
from which it is made (i.e. the particular blend of hot, cold, wet, and dry), the investigation 
of activities will also involve a study of the material substance of the parts.29 The study of 
the chreia of a bodily process or part, on the other hand, involves a general consideration 
of its role in the overall economy of the organism. In particular, it requires the systematic 
examination of the contribution of all the part’s attributes (including substance, shape, and 
arrangement in relation to other parts) to the life of the organism as a whole.30 
In many passages, the chreia of a part is closely associated with the purpose for which it 
was constructed: 
 
Now nature in providing for their [sc. the fingernails’] safety made them moderately 
hard, so as not to detract in any way from the use for which they have come to be [τὴν 
χρείαν, ἧς ἕνεκα γεγόνεσαν], and also to keep them from being easily harmed. (UP 
1.11, 1.21.6-10 H, 3.29 K) 
 
If the leg were completely without movable joints it could not be extended or flexed, 
and so would lose all the use for which it has come to be [τὴν χρείαν, ἧς ἕνεκα 
γέγονεν]. (UP 3.14, 1.185.4-7 H, 3.252 K) 
 16 
Since the whole arm was constructed for many, varied movements, it needed to have 
the head of the humerus rounded ... and to have a concavity associated with it that was 
not very deep and did not end in large rims. For if the joint of the humerus were 
enclosed in a shallow concavity but still restrained all around by large rims, it could not 
be rotated easily in every direction, though this rather than safety was its use [chreia], 
since it was for the sake of this [τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα] that the whole arm was created. 
(UP 13.12, 2.276.1-12 H, 4.129-30 K) 
 
In contexts such as these, to specify the chreia of a part is to state the reason why it is 
present in the organism; the terminology [οὗ ἕνεκα, ‘for the sake of which’] obviously 
recalls the Aristotelian final cause. The connection between chreia and purpose is 
reinforced by an association between chreia and skopos (‘aim’, ‘goal’). Chreia is the 
‘primary aim’ (πρῶτος σκοπός) of the construction of all the parts; the most important 
‘cause’ (aitia) to consider in explaining an organ is ‘the aim of its activity’ (σκοπὸς τῆς 
ἐνεργείας).31 In passages where chreia refers to the reason why a part is present in the 
organism or the purpose for which it came to be, it retains the connotation of ‘need’: to 
state the reason why a part is present is also to say why it is needed. Galen sometimes uses 
the phrase ἀναγκαία χρεία (‘necessary use’) to refer to this sort of essential contribution 
to the organism’s life. For example, the fibula ‘provides a use [chreia] to the animal: the 
primary and necessary one is twofold, but there is a third use for good measure’ (UP 3.13, 
1.180.20-22 H, 3.246 K).32 
As this remark suggests, however, parts may have uses that are not necessary or 
essential for the organism’s life. Galen frequently distinguishes between the chreia ‘for the 
sake of which’ (ἧς ἕνεκα) a part has been created and its other beneficial contributions to 
the organism’s activities:  
 17 
It was, then, for the sake of these activities [ἕνεκα μὲν δὴ τούτων] that the 
convexities at the ends of the ulna and radius came to be; but nature also makes use of 
them to secure another advantage [χρῆται δ' αὐταῖς καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο τι χρηστόν], 
just as she is accustomed frequently to make something that has come to be on account 
of one thing serve other uses as well [τῷ δι’ ἕτερόν τι γεγονότι συγχρῆσθαι καὶ 
πρὸς ἄλλα]. For she located the heads of the tendons moving the fingers in the 
concavity between these eminences, thus establishing as if with a wall or tower a safe 
refuge for the tendons. (UP 2.11, 1.97.19-98.2 H, 3.133 K) 
 
The purpose ‘for the sake of which’ (ἕνεκα) the convexities were made (the mobility of the 
hand) is clearly distinct from the ancillary or spinoff benefit that it confers (protection of the 
tendons). These spinoff benefits are also chreiai, and they are in fact one of the most 
important indications of nature’s craftsmanship: 
 
For the greatest evidence of a resourceful craftsman, as has been said many times 
before, lies in using what has come to be for the sake of one thing also for other uses 
[τὸ συγχρῆσθαι τοῖς ἑτέρου τινὸς ἕνεκα γεγονόσι καὶ πρὸς ἄλλας χρείας], 
instead of seeking to make a special part for each use. (UP 9.5, 2.17.18-22 H, 3.706 K) 
 
How, then, would this too not be among the most wondrous works of nature, namely 
that she is eager to craft each of the organs that has come to be for the sake of some use 
to the animal [ἕνεκά τινος χρείας τῷ ζῴῳ] straightaway also for some other benefit 
[πρὸς ἄλλο τι ... ὠφέλιμον]? (UP 7.22, 1.439.20-3 H, 3.605 K) 
 
In contexts where Galen emphasizes the distinction between ‘primary’ or ‘necessary’ 
chreiai and such spinoff benefits, chreia is more general than purpose; it refers to any 
contribution that a part makes to the organism’s activities. 18 
One way in which Galen attempts to articulate the complex functional organization of 
the human body is by stressing the interdependence of uses and activities. For example, the 
chreia of a part of the hand will be its contribution to the energeia of the hand, grasping; 
but this activity also has many uses (chreiai) for the life of the organism as a whole. A more 
complex example comes in UP 6.9 (322.13-323.17 H, 3.441-3 K). Here Galen argues that 
the hearts of animals with a lung always have the right ventricle, while those of lungless 
animals lack the right ventricle. The right ventricle exists for the sake of (ἕνεκα) the lung 
(i.e. its service to the lung is its chreia), while the lung itself is an organ of respiration and 
voice (i.e. its energeiai, which have further chreiai for the organism as a whole). Criticizing 
Aristotle’s view that the number of chambers of the heart is correlated with the size of the 
organism, Galen writes: 
 
Nature pays no attention to the large or small size of the body when she varies the form 
of the organs; on the contrary, her aim [skopos] in construction is difference of activity 
[energeia], and she measures the activities themselves in turn by their principal use [τῇ 
πρώτῃ χρείᾳ]. Thus there is produced a wonderful series [στοῖχος] of activities and 
uses succeeding one another, as I have demonstrated in what I have already said and as 
my present discourse will show no less clearly to those who will study it with some 
degree of care. (UP 6.9, 1.323.9-17 H, 3.442-3 K) 
 
Elsewhere Galen writes that the ‘association’ or ‘partnership’ (κοινωνία) of chreiai and 
energeiai makes an important contribution to the organism’s life (UP 8.7, 1.475.20-8 H, 
3.655-6 K).  
The interdependence of chreiai and energeiai is also reflected on the methodological 
level. It is a recurrent theme in UP that the study of chreiai presupposes a knowledge of 
energeiai, which itself is sometimes said to be based on the results of dissection.33 Galen 19 
often remarks that it is not his purpose in UP to investigate energeiai; rather, for the 
knowledge of these one should use the results established in other works such as Nat. fac. 
or PHP as ‘foundations’ (ὑποθέσεις).34 On the other hand, he sometimes suggests that 
knowledge of chreiai can confirm an account of energeiai  where the latter is unclear or 
disputed.35 It is possible to grasp the usefulness of some part to the organism as a whole 
without grasping the nature of its activity, just as an activity can be grasped independently 
of its contribution to the overall economy of the organism. Accounts of chreiai  and 
energeiai  thus confirm one another, leading to a more complex methodological situation 
than some of Galen’s explicit remarks might suggest.36 Where the chreia of a part or 
process is known, it can help to determine the nature of the energeiai  invoved; where an 
energeia is known, it can be used to find chreiai. Again, activities are both ‘the starting 
point of investigation and the criterion of what is discovered’ (UP 1.10, 1.20.2-4 H, 3.27 
K). 
The sequence of chreiai  and energeiai revealed by the study of the parts must explain 
their role in promoting the primary activities of the organism. This is relatively 
straightforward in some cases: the parts of the hand are useful because they promote the 
activity of the hand, which has many uses for the animal in attempting to survive in a 
changing environment. In the case of bodily processes such as respiration and the pulse, 
however, the sequence tends towards circularity: the uses of these activities consist partly of 
contributions to their own continued performance. Thus the pulse is the energeia of the 
arteries, and is caused by the pulsative faculty transmitted by the heart; the existence of this 
faculty depends on the constitution of the flesh of the heart, which is the seat of the innate 
heat. The primary chreia of the pulse, Galen says, is maintenance of the innate heat. But 
the innate heat itself also has many uses, including nutrition and digestion, and these 
activities contribute to preserving the distinctive mixtures of the various organs (including 
the heart) so that they can continue to exercise their faculties. Thus the primary use of the 20 
activity of the arteries is to create the conditions necessary for its continued performance by 
maintaining the innate heat, and the uses of the innate heat include the activities that help 
to sustain it. Such circularity is in no way vicious; it is, rather, just what we should expect 
from a sophisticated attempt to explain the feedback inherent in a self-maintaining system 
such as the human body.37 
 
5. Functions 
I now want to consider the extent to which Galen’s concepts of chreia and energeia 
capture the notion of function as it is used in contemporary biology and philosophy of 
science. At first sight it is perhaps natural to think that energeia corresponds to function, for 
the idea of function seems closely linked to activity: an account of a thing’s function is, very 
crudely, an account of something that it does.38 But the function of a part of a complex 
system need not be an activity: it is reasonable to say that the function of the windows in a 
house is to let in light, but this is not an activity.39 In fact it is chreia that corresponds more 
closely than energeia to the modern notion of function, as can be seen from two 
consderations in particular. (1) Giving an account of a part’s chreia involves specifying its 
beneficial contribution to the organism’s activities, chief among them life, reproduction, or 
a better life. Specifying the chreia of a part thus carries an implicit reference to the good or 
benefit of the organism as a whole. The notion that function ascriptions imply a reference 
to the organism’s good, and in particular its survival and reproduction, is fundamental to 
many modern discussions of biological function. One modern attempt to set out a 
conception of biological function that is especially close to Galen’s notion of chreia is that of 
John Canfield.40 For Canfield, to give a functional analysis of a structure, part, or feature of 
an organism is to state what the item in question ‘does’ that is ‘useful’ to the organism 
(where ‘does’ need not imply activity but includes verbs such as ‘store’ or ‘prevent’, and 
‘useful’ is glossed as ‘contributing to survival and reproduction’). Canfield notes further 21 
that the class of items for which functions should be specified includes processes such as the 
heartbeat or the secretion of bile, and also that functions can be understood as contributing 
not only to the organism as a whole but also to ‘subsystems’ such as the homeostasis of 
blood sugar.41 All this is entirely in the spirit of Galen: compare the notion that the use of 
the pulse (which is itself the activity of the arteries) is the maintenance of the innate heat.42 
(2) The second point concerns the kinds of questions that an account of chreia is meant to 
answer. An account of the chreia of a part explains its contribution to the organism’s 
activities; it answers the question: ‘What is this part good for?’ But in giving the chreia of a 
part Galen may also be explaining why it is present in the organism or why it has the 
particular set of attributes that it does; it is these questions, in fact, that seem to be Galen’s 
primary concern throughout UP. The important point is that the scope of functional 
explanation in modern philosophy of science covers both sorts of questions: both ‘What is 
this part good for?’ and ‘Why is this part here?’ To say that the function of the liver is to 
secrete bile is to specify the liver’s contribution to the animal’s survival, but it may also be 
part of an explanation of the presence of livers in animals (e.g. because the presence of an 
organ to secrete bile was favored by natural selection).43 For these reasons, Galen’s 
accounts of chreia can reasonably be viewed as functional explanations. 
To be sure, Galen’s use of chreia is broader than some contemporary conceptions of 
function in at least two respects. First there is the issue of the kinds of activities to which 
chreiai are viewed as contributing: these include more than just survival and reproduction, 
for Galen says that chreia can be understood as a contribution to living well (τὸ καλῶς 
ζῆν). In this he follows both Plato and Aristotle.44 Second, there is the more problematic 
question of whether utility alone is an adequate criterion for the identification of functions. 
Much of the recent literature is based on the idea that functions must be distinguished from 
accidental benefits. The importance of the distinction between function and accident has 
been urged especially by Wright, who remarks: ‘Something can do something useful purely 22 
by accident, but it cannot have, as its function, something it does only by accident.’45 Since 
for Galen chreia can refer to any beneficial contribution to the organism’s life, it would 
seem that he lacks the means for distinguishing genuine functions from accidental benefits.  
In fact, however, the situation is both more complicated and more interesting. As we 
have seen, Galen’s concept of chreia is richly differentiated, and he frequently distinguishes 
between ‘spinoff’ benefits and the ‘primary chreia’ for which a part was created. Building 
on this distinction, one might develop a view on which the functions of the parts would be 
limited to their primary chreiai, as reflected in the need for the Demiurge or nature to 
bring them into existence in the first place. But it is also possible to take Galen’s wide-
ranging application of the concept of chreia to support the idea that any contribution a part 
makes to the organism’s activities may be considered one of its functions. It is not at all 
clear that the distinction between functions and accidental benefits is as fundamental as 
some modern authors have taken it to be. If functions are understood as contributions to 
the welfare of the organism as a whole, there is no obvious reason to rule out any such 
contribution from counting as a genuine function.46 
However this may be, it should be clear that Galen’s use of the concept of chreia shares 
a good deal of common ground with modern discussions of biological function, as it does 
with Aristotelian functional analysis. The basic reason for this is that for Galen, ascriptions 
of chreia are always referred back to the organism’s good, understood as survival, 
reproduction, or a better life. Galen may be a lot more generous than Aristotle in ascribing 
functions to the parts and their attributes (see next section), but it can hardly be said that 
his ascriptions are arbitrary or piecemeal. Rather, they flow from a sophisticated analysis of 
the organism’s activities and the various ways in which the parts contribute to their 
performance.  
 
6. From functions to design 23 
So far I have emphasized the close similarities between Galen’s and Aristotle’s 
functional approach to the study of living things. But there are of course major differences 
as well, and it is important to take note of them. First of all, Galen’s argument in UP is not 
only that the parts of the body are adapted to the performance of the organism’s activities, 
but also that they are so well adapted to carrying out those activities that no better 
construction is possible. At the beginning of UP 1.5, immediately after his introductory 
discussion of the human hand, Galen goes on to give the first of many statements of this 
fundamental thesis: 
 
Come now, let us investigate this very important part of man’s body, examining it to 
determine not simply whether it is useful or whether it is suitable for an intelligent 
animal, but whether it is in every respect so constructed that it would not have been 
better had it come into being differently. (UP 1.5, 1.6.18-22 H, 3.9 K) 
 
Galen’s attempts to discern purpose in the structure and arrangement of the parts of the 
body are nothing less than an effort to demonstrate this sweeping claim. Now while 
Aristotle is certainly concerned to show that the parts of a human being are ‘useful’ and 
‘suitable for an intelligent animal’, it is no part of his project to argue that the parts are so 
well constructed that they could not be any better. For Aristotle, the goal is just to show 
that a certain feature or structure makes some contribution to the organism’s activities, 
especially survival or reproduction; for Galen this is only the beginning. This explains the 
abundance of counterfactual argument in UP: Galen often argues that if a certain part were 
any larger or smaller, or placed differently in any way, the activities of the organism would 
somehow be impaired.47 Such arguments play no role in Aristotle’s accounts of living 
things. In general Galen’s teleology is comprehensive in a way that Aristotle’s is not. He is 
committed to finding a use for virtually every part of the body, and every attribute; 24 
Aristotle, by contrast, is more willing to acknowledge that some parts are present for no 
purpose.48 
Thus Galen, as well as adopting a functional approach to the study of the parts, also 
argued for the claim that the human body displays optimal construction. As Galen sees it, 
this is largely a matter of the best possible adaptation of structure to function. But it is 
important to see that an argument for optimal construction is independent of a concern 
with functional explanation as such. As the example of Aristotle shows, one can adopt a 
functional approach to the study of the parts without arguing for their optimal 
construction. And one might also argue that the parts are structured as well as they could 
possibly be without grounding this in a notion of functional organization. Galen’s concern 
to argue for optimal construction thus reflects different commitments than those which 
motivate his functional approach.  
In fact, this concern is connected with a feature of Galen’s thought that is Platonic 
rather than Aristotelian: the notion that a divine Craftsman or Demiurge is ultimately 
responsible for the order discernible in the world as a whole and living things in particular. 
That the human body is constructed ‘as well as it could possibly be’ is for Galen a major 
piece of evidence for the existence of the Demiurge. In the last book of De usu partium, 
Galen discusses the purpose of studying the uses of the parts. This study has several uses 
for the doctor, including diagnosis and prognosis (UP 17.2, 2.449.20-450.26 H, 4.363-4 
K). But the main reason to pursue it is for what it reveals about the beneficent intelligence 
that is responsible for the design of the human being: 
 
Thus, when anyone looking at the facts with an open mind sees that in such a slime of 
fleshes and juices there is yet an indwelling intelligence and sees too the structure of any 
animal whatsoever — for they all give indication [ἔνδειξις] of a wise craftsman — he 
will understand the superiority of the intelligence in the heavens. Then a work on the 25 
use of the parts, which at first seemed to him a thing of scant importance, will be truly 
established as the starting point [ἀρχή] of a precise theology [θεολογίας ἀκριβοῦς], 
which is a thing far greater and far more honorable than all of medicine. Hence such a 
work is useful not only for the doctor, but much more so for the philosopher who is 
eager to gain an understanding of the whole of nature. (UP 17.1, 2.447.16-448.3 H, 
4.360-1 K) 
 
The crucial step in the argument is the move from optimal construction to the existence of 
the Demiurge — a classic example of ‘inference to the best explanation’, which is strictly 
speaking no inference at all. Galen views the situation as a choice between two exhaustive 
alternatives: either the marvelous construction of living things is due to the random 
collision of elementary particles, or else it is the result of divine intelligence (UP 17.1, 
2.440.3-41.10 H, 4.350-51 K). Given this choice, Galen opts for the latter alternative as 
the best explanation. It is not my intention to evaluate the plausibility of this move here; I 
want only to point out that it too is independent of a functional approach to the study of the 
parts. Just as one can argue for optimal construction on grounds other than functional 
organization, so too the move from optimal construction to design does not itself imply a 
concern with functional explanation. This suggests that it was not the assumption of design 
that motivated Galen’s functional approach, but rather the Aristotelian notion of the 
organism as a unified whole manifesting a coherent pattern of activities such as self-
maintenance and reproduction. 
Now it is true that, for Galen, functional considerations do enter into the arguments for 
the optimal construction of the body and the existence of the Demiurge. They do so via the 
notion of craftsmanship (technē). The human body, Galen claims, displays a superlative 
degree of craftsmanship; hence it must be the work of a divine Craftsman, even if we 
cannot perceive his existence directly.49 Galen’s notion of craftsmanship involves a number 26 
of features, including symmetry (συμμετρία), equality (ἰσότης), proportion (ἀναλογία), 
and beauty, but the most important feature is the adaptation of structure to function.50 Just 
as the craftsman constructs all the parts of a complex artifact with a view to the uses they 
must serve in the whole, so all the parts of the human body are constructed to perform 
their functions in the whole organism. The perfect adaptation of the parts of an artifact to 
their uses is a reliable indication of craftsmanship, and this holds no less of the human body 
than of an artifact such as a ship or a couch. Of those who fail to recognize the 
craftsmanship manifest in living things, Galen writes: 
 
They completely forget the judgment that all men naturally make about the arts 
[technai], and they forget the very great similarity between our construction and the 
arts; and yet they see many men working with materials who are not called shoemakers 
of builders or molders unless it is evident that every object they fashion has been made 
for some useful purpose [χρησίμου ἕνεκά τινος], since there is no other mark of an 
art besides the use [chreia] of each part of the product it fashions. (PHP 9.8, 2.590.30-
592.1 De Lacy, 5.784 K) 
 
Thus, grasping the supposedly perfect adaptation of structure to function in the body 
reveals that it is the product of craftsmanship, which in turn reveals the existence of the 
Demiurge. 
However, even though Galen believes that the complex functional organization of 
living things could never have arisen without divine intelligence, it does not follow that the 
uses of the parts can only be understood with reference to the Demiurge’s intentions. This 
is because Galen, like Aristotle, holds that organisms have internal rather than external 
teleology: that is, the end subserved by the parts of an organism is the continued existence 
of the organism as a whole, rather than any purpose external to it. The teleology of 27 
artifacts, by contrast, is external: an artifact is created by an intelligent agent to serve some 
purpose that lies outside the artifact itself.51 Now it is certainly possible to conceive of 
organisms as having external teleology in this sense. The Stoics, for example, argued that 
living things are part of a hierarchy in which each kind of organism serves a purpose 
external to it that is established by God: the purpose of grass is to be eaten by sheep, just as 
that of sheep is to be eaten by man.52 On such a view, the functions of the parts of an 
organism are determined by their contributions to the purpose of the organism as a whole: 
as Chrysippus put it, the pig has a soul to keep it fresh for the slaughterhouse.53 But Galen 
does not think that organisms have purposes external to themselves, and his version of the 
argument from design makes no appeal to such considerations.54 In arguing that living 
things display craftsmanship, Galen does not appeal to the idea that an artifact as a whole 
has a use; instead what he emphasizes is that all the parts are optimally useful with respect 
to the whole.55 While the functions of the parts of an externally teleological system depend 
on the purpose for which the system has been designed, the functions of the parts of an 
internally teleological system can be understood independently of the intentions of its 
designer — if there is one. The parts have functions, understood as contributions to the 
system’s continued existence, whether or not the system was designed by an intelligent 
agent.56 In this way, even though Galen thinks that living organisms are so complex that 
they could never have arisen without intelligent design, the chreiai of their parts can be 
understood independently of any reference to the Demiurge’s intentions.  
Moreover it is not the case that the parts are useful just because the Demiurge created 
them or gave them a certain structure; rather, the Demiurge creates the parts and 
structures them as he does because such an arrangement is maximally beneficial to the 
organism. It is chreia that determines the Demiurge’s intentions, not the other way 
around.57 The Demiurge simply reasons like any good craftsman would; if we are able and 
apply ourselves to the study of the parts, we can reconstruct his reasoning. The uses of the 28 
parts of course correspond to the Demiurge’s intentions, but that is just because he is 
supremely intelligent and therefore able to grasp what sort of construction would be most 
useful to an organism of a certain kind. And because he is supremely powerful (though not 
omnipotent), he is largely able to realize this construction.58 In an important sense, then, 
Galen’s functional explanations are independent of the thesis of design. What they tell us is 
why the Demiurge structured the parts in a certain way. That the Demiurge intended to 
act as he did is indeed fortunate; it tells us something about him and about how the body 
came to be structured as it is. But in itself it is irrelevant to the fact that the parts structured 
in this way are useful; that is because of their beneficial contributions to the organism as a 
whole.59 
It would no doubt be overly simplistic to suppose that Galen adopted the thesis of 
design purely on the basis of his investigation of the correspondence between structure and 
function in the organism. Galen obviously had many reasons for his commitment to the 
existence of a Platonic Demiurge, some of them religious or theological, others connected 
with his own education and the intellectual prestige of Plato in the philosophical tradition.60 
The assumption that the body is the result of providential design must have functioned as a 
heuristic principle legitimating the search for uses of the parts even where others had seen 
none: once it is accepted that the design of the human body is the result of the activity of a 
Demiurge who is supremely good, powerful, and intelligent, there is every reason to 
suppose that he will have left no part without a use insofar as this is possible.61 As a guide to 
anatomical investigation such a principle is undeniably fruitful, even if it did sometimes lead 
to excesses. Nevertheless the fact remains that Galen’s explicit argument in UP and PHP 9 
is from optimal construction, understood as consummate craftsmanship, to the existence of 
the Demiurge. Craftsmanship is chiefly a matter of the adaptation of structure to function, 
and so the starting point of the whole argument is a grasp of the complex functional 
organization of living things. As I have tried to show, Galen had good reasons to adopt this 29 
as a starting point for his biological investigations — reasons which were independent of 
some of the bolder and more sweeping conclusions he attempted to draw from them. 
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1 C. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York, 1965), 304-5: ‘The kind of 
phenomenon that a functional analysis is invoked to explain is typically some recurrent 
activity or some behavior pattern in an individual or a group, such as a physiological 
mechanism, a neurotic trait, a culture pattern, or a social institution. And the principal 
objective of the analysis is to exhibit the contribution which the behavior pattern makes to 
the preservation or the development of the individual or the group in which it occurs. 
Thus, functional analysis seeks to understand a behavior pattern or a sociocultural 
institution by determining the role it plays in keeping the system in working order or 
maintaining it as a going concern.’ For E. Nagel, functions are analyzed in terms of the 
contributions of parts of a system to the maintenance of its global properties or modes of 
behavior, and the function-bearer is viewed as supporting the ‘characteristic activities’ of 
the system (The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation 
[Structure] [New York, 1961], 403, 409, 421-2).  
 
2 Nagel (Structure, ch. 12) argues for the possibility of reducing teleological to non-
teleological explanations, while recognizing the importance of functional explanation as a 
mode of investigation in the biological sciences. See also Hempel (Aspects of Scientific 
Explanation, 297-330); J. Canfield, ‘Teleological Explanation in Biology’, British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science, 14:56 (1964), 285-95; F. J. Ayala, ‘Teleological Explanations 33 
                                                                                                                                                            
in Evolutionary Biology’, Philosophy of Science, 37:1 (1970), 1-15; L. Wright, ‘Functions’, 
Philosophical Review, 82:2 (1973), 139-68; and for a full review of the contemporary 
literature and all the major issues P. McLaughlin, What Functions Explain: Functional 
Explanation and Self-Reproducing Systems [What Functions Explain] (Cambridge, 2001). 
 
3 Nagel, Structure, 401. 
 
4 For UP and Nat. fac. I use the Greek text of G. Helmreich (Galeni De usu partium Libri 
XVII, 2 vols. [Leipzig, 1907-9]; Claudii Galeni Pergameni scripta minora, vol. 3 [Leipzig, 
1893]), with reference to volume, page and line of his edition (H) followed by the reference 
to volume and page in the edition of C. G. Kühn (Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia, 20 vols. in 
22 [Leipzig, 1821-33; repr. Hildesheim, 1965]). For all other Galenic works I give the 
volume and page reference to Kühn (K) along with references to more recent editions 
where available. Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated, but I have drawn 
extensively on the excellent translation of M. T. May (Galen: On the Usefulness of the 
Parts of the Body [Usefulness], 2 vols. [Cornell, 1968]).  
 
5 In general the Hippocratics conceive of the parts of the body in structural rather than 
functional terms: they are ‘forms’ or ‘conformations’ (σχήματα, Hp. VM 22) rather than 
‘organs’ or ‘instruments’ (organa). For the general point see J. Jouanna, Hippocrates 
(Baltimore, 1999), 310-11; see also B. Gundert, ‘Parts and Their Roles in Hippocratic 
Medicine’, Isis, 83:3 (1992), 453-65. The sole Hippocratic treatise that can be said to adopt 
a consistently functional approach is On the Heart (De corde), but this feature is generally 
regarded as a sign of its Hellenistic date; see I. M. Lonie, ‘The Paradoxical Text On the 
Heart’, Medical History, 17 (1973), 1-15 and 136-53 at 4-5, 143-7. Cf. esp. De corde 8, 34 
                                                                                                                                                            
9.84-6 Littré on the auricles as ‘instruments’ (organa) with which nature captures the air, 
like the bellows in a blacksmith’s furnace.  
 
6 On Aristotle’s functional approach see M. Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium 
[De Motu] (Princeton, 1978), 76-85 and M. R. Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford, 
2005), 159-78.  
 
7 Even the parts of plants are organs, albeit very simple ones: the leaf protects the pericarp, 
and the roots attract nutriment like a mouth (An. 412b1-4). Cf. An. 416a4-6: ‘the head in 
animals is analogous to the roots in plants, if we are to identify and distinguish organs 
(organa) by their functions (erga)’. 
 
8 An. 435b17-25, esp. 435b20-21 (οὐ τοῦ εἶναι ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ εὖ). Cf. PA 640a33-b1 
and 670b23-7: the kidneys are present ‘for the sake of what is good and fine’ (τοῦ εὖ καὶ 
καλῶς ἕνεκεν), i.e. ‘so that the bladder might perform its function (ergon) better’. On this 
category of parts see Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, 188-9 and 197-8. Cf. also Plato, 
Timaeus 75 D 5-E 5 on the dual role of the mouth and tongue as both serving a necessary 
purpose and contributing to the best life. 
 
9 I take this to be a consequence of the fact that for Aristotle, the final cause must be an end 
of whatever it is meant to explain: the cause ‘for the sake of which’ is always referred to the 
nature (physis) or essence (ousia) of the individual thing in question (cf. Phys. 198b8-9). 
This is not to deny that the various natural kinds may be so ordered as to benefit one 
another by the fulfillment of their individual ends (cf. Metaph. Λ 10), or that the lower 
creatures may be instrumentally useful to man (cf. Pol. 1256b10-22). The point is just that 35 
                                                                                                                                                            
the good that is relevant to the final cause is the good of the organism as specified in its 
definition or logos, not the good of anything outside it. See Nussbaum, De Motu, 95-7 and 
Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology for a comprehensive and (I think) convincing defense of 
this interpretation. For the contrary view see D. Sedley, ‘Is Aristotle’s Teleology 
Anthropocentric’, Phronesis, 36 (1991), 179-96.  
 
10 In dividing up the activities of soul and nature in this way Galen follows Stoic usage.  
 
11 Cf. P. Moraux, ‘Galen and Aristotle’s De partibus animalium’, in A. Gotthelf (ed.), 
Aristotle on Nature and Living Things: Philosophical and Historical Studies Presented to 
David M. Balme on His Seventieth Birthday (Pittsburgh, 1985), 327-44. 
 
12 UP 14.1, 2.284.20-285.1 H, 4.142 K: ‘Nature had three principal aims [skopoi] in 
constructing the parts of the animal; for she crafted them either for the sake of life [ἕνεκα 
τοῦ ζῆν] (the brain, heart, and liver), or for a better life [τοῦ βέλτιον ζῆν] (the eyes, 
ears, and nostrils), or for the continuance of the race [τῆς τοῦ γένους διαδοχῆς] (the 
pudenda, testes, and uteri).’ 
 
13 De methodo medendi 1.6, 10.47 K: ‘I call an organ [organon] a part of the animal that is 
productive of a complete activity [energeia], as the eye is of vision, the tongue of speech, 
and the legs of walking; so too arteries, veins and nerves are both organs [organa] and parts 
[moria] of animals.’  
 
14 For recognition of the Aristotelian background see De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 
(PHP) 1.8, 1.92.23-94.15 De Lacy, 5.202-3 K. Cf. UP 8.4, 1.454.8-11 H, 3.627 K, 36 
                                                                                                                                                            
criticizing Aristotle for being deceived by ‘names which are established not from the very 
essence [οὐσία] of the thing, but from some accidental characteristics [ἀπό τινων 
συμβεβηκότων]’. 
 
15 κατὰ μὲν οὐλομελίην πάντα συμπαθέα, κατὰ μέρος  δὲ τὰ ἐν ἑκάστῳ μέρει 
μέρεα πρὸς τὸ ἔργον. However, this differs slightly from the standard modern text of On 
Nutriment (R. Joly, Hippocrate, tome VI pt. 2 [Paris, 1972], 143): Σύρροια μία, 
σύμπνοια μία, συμπαθέα πάντα· κατὰ μὲν οὐλομελίην πάντα, κατὰ μέρος  δὲ τὰ 
ἐν ἑκάστῳ μέρει μέρεα πρὸς τὸ ἔργον. This might be rendered: ‘Conflux one, 
conspiration one, all things in sympathy; all the parts as forming a whole, and severally the 
parts in each part, with reference to the work’ (so W. H. S. Jones, Hippocrates 1 
[Cambridge, MA, 1923], 351). Galen was fond of the aphorism and refers to it on a 
number of occasions as expressing the essence of Hippocrates’ teaching about the body; see 
Nat. fac. 1.12, 122.6-10 H, 2.29 K; 1.13, 129.7-9 H, 2.39 K; 3.13, 238.4-7 H, 2.189 K; 
3.13, 243.10-13 H, 2.196 K; De causis pulsuum 2.12, 9.88 K; De tremore 6, 7.616 K; and 
De methodo medendi 1.2, 10.16 K (where the doctrine is ascribed to both Aristotle and 
the Stoics as well as Hippocrates). For the Stoic influence on Alim. see H. Diller, ‘Eine 
Stoisch-pneumatische Schrift im Corpus Hippocraticum’, Sudhoffs Archiv, 29 (1936), 
178-95, repr. in G. Baader and H. Grensemann (eds.), Hans Diller: Kleine Schriften zur 
Antiken Medizin (Berlin, 1973), 17-30. 
 
16 I follow May in translating ὁμολογεῖν as ‘cooperate’ (rather than, say, ‘agree’) since I 
take Galen’s point to be not just that the parts ‘agree’ or ‘accord’ with one another (i.e. 
that they fit together well, making compatible but distinct contributions to the organism’s 
activities), but also that they actively work together to promote the organism’s activities. 37 
                                                                                                                                                            
The ideas of active assistance and interdependence between the parts are suggested by the 
references to ‘sympathy’ (συμπάθεια), ‘conspiration’ (σύμπνοια), and ‘conflux’ 
(σύρροια) in the Hippocratic passage that Galen is expounding here.  
 
17 For the heart as the source of the arteries and their role in maintaining the vital heat and 
nourishing the psychic pneuma see UP 1.16, 1.32.23-33.10 H, 3.45-6 K. For the 
dependence of the liver on the brain and heart see UP 4.13, 1.227.4-23 H, 3.309-10 K: 
arteries from the heart arrive at the liver in order to preserve the due measure of heat in it, 
and a nerve is inserted into its outer tunic to prevent it from being completely without 
sensation. For ἐπικουρία cf. De propriis placitis 10, with the new text of  V. Boudon-
Millot and A. Pietrobelli, ‘Galien ressuscité: édition princeps du texte grec du De propriis 
placitis’ [‘Galien ressuscité’], Revue des Études Grecques, 118 (2005), 168-213, at 181.26-
182.15.  
 
18 The discussion of R. Siegel, Galen on Psychology, Pschopathology, and Function and 
Diseases of the Nervous System: An Analysis of His Observations and Experiments (Basel, 
1973), 31-53 has the merit of drawing attention to Galen’s conception of functional 
integration or interdependence, though his translations and analyses are often unreliable. 
 
19 On Galen’s use/activity distinction see D. Furley and J. S. Wilkie, Galen on Respiration 
and the Arteries [Galen on Respiration] (Princeton, 1984), 58-69; R. J. Hankinson, ‘Galen 
Explains the Elephant’, in M. Matthen and B. Linsky (eds.), Philosophy and Biology 
(Calgary, 1988), 135-57. 
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20 Nat. fac. 1.2, 105.13-23 H, 2.6-7 K. Cf. De methodo medendi 1.6, 10.45-6 K; 2.3, 10.87 
K; and PHP 6.1, 2.360.22-3 De Lacy, 5.506 K: ‘Now activity is active change, and I mean 
by “active” a change arising from the thing itself, while “affection” is change in one thing 
that arises from another’ (ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐνέργεια κίνησίς ἐστι δραστική, δραστικὴν δ' 
ὀνομάζω τὴν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ δὲ πάθος ἐν ἑτέρῳ κίνησίς ἐστιν ἐξ ἑτέρου). Galen goes 
on to say that the active and passive changes are often the same process, but viewed in two 
different ways; e.g. the separation of a cut object is an activity of the cutter but an affection 
of what is cut. But then he adds that according to another usage energeia is change 
‘according to nature’ (κατὰ φύσιν) and πάθος change ‘contrary to nature’ (παρὰ 
φύσιν), and that when the terms are used in this sense it does not matter whether the 
source of the change is internal or external (2.360.23-362.9 De Lacy, 5.506-7 K). 
 
 
21 The term ‘active’ (δραστικός) is not found in Aristotle, and its use by Galen probably 
reflects Stoic influence. Moreover, while Aristotle recognizes a close association between 
energeia and kinēsis, he also draws important distinctions between the two concepts (see 
esp. Metaph. 1048 b18-35). 
 
22 A TLG search for the various forms of chreia in UP yields some 467 instances.  
 
23 See also UP 6.7, 1.318.15-19 H, 3.436 K (those parts of the heart are most important 
[κύριον] whose chreiai preserve the life of the whole organism) and UP 8.6, 1.471.14-16 
H, 3.650 K: the pores of the nostrils have two chreiai, one of which is necessary for life 
itself (the discharge of residues from the brain), the other for a better life (the transmission 
of odors to the organ of smell). 
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24 Pace May (Usefulness, vol. 1, 9), who takes the basic meaning to be ‘the suitability or 
fitness of a part for performing its action’. The translation ‘use’ is in keeping with the 
traditional Latin title, De usu partium; cf. also the titles περὶ χρείας ἀναπνοῆς (De usu 
respirationis) and περὶ χρείας σφυγμῶν (De usu pulsuum). In Harvey’s usage, the terms 
usus and actio correspond to Galen’s chreia and energeia; see Furley and Wilkie, Galen on 
Respiration, 61. 
  
25 UP 1.16, 1.32.23-33.10 H, 3.45-6 K; cf. De usu pulsuum 3, 5.160-1 K. See also UP 6.4, 
1.308.15-18 H, 3.422 K: ‘Where the use of the activity [ἡ τῆς ἐνεργείας ... χρεία] of 
each of two organs is of equal importance [ὁμότιμος], as for the eyes and ears and hands 
and feet, nature has made the ones on the right exactly equal to those on the left.’  
 
26 συναφθείσης τῷ τῆς ἐνεργείας χρησίμῳ τῆς χρείας τοῦ μορίου: UP 17.1, 
2.438.19-20 H, 4.348 K. Cf. UP 11.16, 2.167.15-17 H, 3.918 K: ‘when the activity 
[energeia] of this muscle has been discovered, its use [chreia] is also immediately clear’. 
 
27 UP 6.4, 1.307.25-308.1 H, 3.421 K: ‘Indeed, the use [chreia] of the respiratory organs 
would rightly come about through movement [διὰ τῆς κινήσεως], while that of organs of 
support would come about through rest [δι’ ἡσυχίας]’. UP 7.12, 1.407.7-14 H, 3.559-60 
K: ‘Now when parts act, their use [chreia] straightaway becomes evident at the same time, 
and anyone who is explaining use [chreia] need only mention their activity [energeia]. But 
for those parts which perform no activity manifestly useful to the animal as a whole (for this 
is how you should always understand use) but which subserve parts that do act, I must give 
in this treatise an explanation in greater detail; for this is its special purpose.’ 
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28 For Galen’s discussion of this question see PHP 6.7, 2.404.38-406.24 De Lacy, 5.560-2 
K; An in arteriis natura sanguis contineatur 8, 4.733-4 K. 
 
29 For the dependence of energeiai on the substance of the organs see e.g. Nat. fac. 1.3, 
106.4-6 H, 2.7 K.  
  
30 See UP 1.9, 1.19.9-24 H, 3.26-7 K and UP 4.13, 1.220.19-25 H, 3.300 K on the need to 
study not just the distinctive substance of the parts but also their placement, number, size, 
contexture (πλοκή), shaping (διάπλασις), connection (ξύμφυσις), and interrelationships 
(τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα κοινωνίας ἁπάσης). 
 
31 UP 11.13, 2.153.19-26 H, 3.899 K; 6.12, 1.338.20-22 H, 3.464 K. Cf. also UP 6.4, 
1.308.18-27 H, 3.422 K; 5.9, 1.276.26-277.4 H, 3.378 K. 
 
32 See also De anatomicis administrationibus 7.1, 2.590 K: ‘All these things nature made in 
the first instance [κατὰ πρῶτον λόγον], some of them for the sake of necessary uses 
[ἀναγκαίων ἕνεκα χρειῶν], for life itself, but others for uses that are indeed beneficial to 
living things, but not necessary to them’. 
 
33 E.g. UP 2.7, 1.86.1-4 H, 3.117 K; 2.16, 1.114.6-12 H, 3.155 K; 6.12, 1.337.22-338.1 H, 
3.463 K; 7.4, 1.379.23-380.1 H, 3.522-3 K; 7.12, 1.407.4-7 H, 3.559 K. 
 
34 E.g. UP 4.13, 1.226.7-15 H, 3.308 K; 4.17, 1.241.19-242.1 H, 3.329 K; 8.4, 1.453.11-18 
H, 3.625-6 K; 8.11, 1.484.15-23 H, 3.667-8 K. 
 41 
                                                                                                                                                            
35 E.g. UP 5.5, 1.266.24-267.4 H, 3.364 K; 7.5, 1.382.15-18 H, 3.526 K; 7.8, 1.391.24-25 
H, 3.539 K. 
 
36 Cf. UP 7.5, 1.383.25-384.3 H, 3.528 K: ‘But now, since I have shown that all the true 
statements I have made about uses [chreiai] in this exposition and about activities 
[energeiai] in earlier ones are consistent and corroborate one another [πάντ’ ἀλλήλοις 
ὁμολογεῖ τε καὶ μαρτυρεῖ τἀληθῆ], let us proceed to discuss the remaining parts of the 
lung’. 
 
37 The circularity is noted by Wilkie (Galen on Respiration, 66-7), but he does not connect 
it with the need to account for the organism as a self-maintaining system. For the role of 
the innate heat in causing nutrition and digestion see Nat. fac. 2.4, 165.23-166.12 H, 2.89-
90 K. Galen sometimes identifies it as the cause of the motion of the arteries, as at PHP 
8.7, 2.524.10-13 De Lacy, 5.702 K. At De causis pulsuum 1.2, 9.4-5 K, however, he 
refuses to state whether the cause of the pulse is the innate heat, the peculiar blend of 
qualities in the heart, or a number of other possibilities; he is willing only to assert the 
existence of a faculty (dynamis) that causes the pulse. For the self-maintaining character of 
the innate heat see De tremore 6, 7.616 K, where it is identified with nature and soul: ‘And 
nature and soul are nothing other than this, so that if you think of it as an self-moving, ever-
moving substance (οὐσίαν αὐτοκίνητόν τε καὶ ἀεικίνητον), you will not be in error’. 
  
38 May thinks that energeia is closer to ‘function’ than chreia (Usefulness, vol. 1, 9). M. 
Beckner (‘Function and Teleology’,  Journal of the History of Biology, 2 [1969], 151-64) 
restricts functions to activities.  
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39 The example is taken from Wright, ‘Functions’ (above, n.2), 139; cf. ibid., 152 (objecting 
to Beckner): ‘It is not at all clear that functions — even natural functions — have to be 
activities at all ... Making seconds easier to read is an example, but there are many others: 
preventing skids in wet weather, keeping your pants up, or propping open my office door. 
All of these things are legitimate functions (of tire treads, belts, and doorstops, 
respectively); none are activities in any recognizable sense.’  
 
40 Canfield, ‘Teleological Explanation in Biology’ (above, n. 2). 
 
41 Canfield, ‘Teleological Explanation in Biology’, 287 n. 1. 
 
42 R. Sorabji (‘Function’, Philosophical Quarterly, 14:57, [1964], 289-302) identifies 
contribution to a good as an essential attribute of functions in living organisms and social 
systems. Various authors (e.g. Wright) have attacked the view that a contribution to the 
organism’s good is essential to function ascriptions; but see McLaughlin, What Functions 
Explain, for a defense of the view that function ascriptions, if they are to be genuinely 
explanatory, demand an (Aristotelian) metaphysical commitment to the existence of the 
organism as the beneficiary of a good. 
 
43 Wright is a leading proponent of the view that function ascriptions explain the presence 
of the function-bearer in biological systems, via the mechanism of natural selection. Thus, 
the function of the liver is what the liver does in a organism that also explains (via natural 
selection) why livers are there: ‘If an organ has been naturally differentially selected-for by 
virtue of something it does, we can say that the reason the organ is there is that it does that 
something’ (‘Functions’, 159). On his view, we can say that Y is the function of a part X if 
and only if X does Y and X is there because it does Y. For the alternative view that what 43 
                                                                                                                                                            
functions explain is not the presence of the function-bearer but rather its role in a complex 
system see esp. R. Cummins, ‘Functional Analysis’, Journal of Philosophy, 72 (1975), 741-
65. 
 
44 As Sorabji has noted (‘Function’, 293-5), both Plato and Aristotle recognize the 
distinction between activities essential for the preservation of life and those that make it 
possible to live well (cf. n. 8 above). He makes a good case for regarding contributions to 
the latter kind of activities as ‘luxury functions’. 
 
45 Wright, ‘Functions’, 147, objecting to the view of Canfield mentioned above. 
 
46 Wright, who has emphasized the importance of the function/accident distinction, also 
rejects the notion that functions can be understood as contributions to the organism’s 
welfare. 
 
47 As R. J. Hankinson notes (‘Galen and the Best of All Possible Worlds’, Classical 
Quarterly, NS 39:1 [1989], 206-27 at 220-1), such arguments are open to objection in that 
they presuppose that all the parts other than the one in question are fixed, so that only 
variation in that particular part needs to be considered when evaluating whether it is 
structured as well as it could possibly be. But this ignores the possibility that a radically 
different structural plan might enable the organism to perform its activities better. 
 
48 The spleen is a case in point (PA 670a30-1); cf. also the remarks on bile at PA 677a11-
19. Such parts or constituents, Aristotle thinks, follow necessarily from the presence of 
parts that do have a purpose; cf. Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, 197. It is sometimes said 44 
                                                                                                                                                            
that Galen refuses to acknowledge the existence of any parts of this kind in the body (e.g. 
Hankinson, ‘Galen and the Best of All Possible Worlds’, 214). See however UP 5.3 on the 
jejunum or νῆστις, which provides no chreia to the organism but ‘follows by necessity on 
parts which have come to be for a purpose [ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕπεσθαι τοῖς ἕνεκά του 
γεγονόσιν]’, 1.254.6-7 H, 3.346 K); cf. also UP 5.16, 1.297.21-24 H, 3.406 K (the 
obliquity of the neck of the bladder follows of necessity on purposive structures) and UP 
11.14, 2.160.20-161.1 H, 3.908-9 K (hair in the armpits is due not to the providence 
[pronoia] of the Demiurge, but rather to the nature of the fluids there). Galen says that 
such features are simply not his concern in UP: ‘For in these commentaries I am explaining 
not the necessary consequences of things that have come to be for a purpose [τῶν ἐξ 
ἀνάγκης ἑπομένων τοῖς ἕνεκά του γεγονόσιν], but those things that have been 
crafted by nature in the first instance [τῶν κατὰ πρῶτον λόγον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως 
δεδημιουργημένων]’ (5.3, 1.257.4-8 H, 3.350-1 K). None of this is to deny, of course, 
that Galen is much more systematic and comprehensive than Aristotle in his search for uses 
of the parts. 
 
49 The claim that the human body displays skilled craftsmanship is a constant refrain 
throughout UP; Galen elaborates on it at length in UP 17.1 (2.441.10-446.7 H, 4.351-8 
K). In PHP 9.8 Galen presents the inference from the craftsmanship of the body to the 
existence of the Demiurge as a paradigm example of inductive reasoning (2.590-6 De 
Lacy, 5.782-91 K). At PHP 9.8, 2.596.5-20 De Lacy, 5.789-91 K Galen argues that to 
doubt the existence of the Demiurge simply because he cannot be perceived directly would 
be as absurd as doubting that an artifact such as a bed or couch was made by a craftsman 
just because he has never been seen.  
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50 For these features of the craftsmanship of the body see esp. UP 17.1, 441.10-446.7 H, 
4.351-58 K and PHP 9.8, 2.592.22-596.4 De Lacy, 5.786-89 K. For beauty as the 
adaptation of structure to function see UP 1.9, 1.17.20-18.5 H, 3.24-5 K: ‘And so, if you 
are seeking to discover the proper form for the eye or nose, you will find it by correlating 
their structure [κατασκευή] and activities [energeiai]. In fact, this is your standard, 
measure, and criterion of proper form and true beauty [κάλλος], since true beauty is 
nothing but excellence of structure, and in obedience to Hippocrates you will judge that 
excellence from activities [energeiai], not from whiteness, softness, or other such qualities, 
which are indications of a beauty meretricious and false, not natural and true.’ 
  
51 For the distinction between external and internal teleology see Ayala, ‘Teleological 
Explanations in Evolutionary Biology’ (above, n. 2), esp. 13: ‘A feature of a system will be 
teleological in the sense of internal teleology if the feature has utility for the system in which 
it exists and if such utility explains the presence of the feature in the systems. Utility in 
living organisms is defined in terms of survival or reproduction. A structure or process of an 
organism is teleological if it contributes to the reproductive efficiency of the organism itself, 
and if such contribution accounts for the existence of the structure or process. Man-made 
tools or mechanisms are teleological with external teleology if they have utility, i.e., if they 
have been designed to serve a specified purpose, which therefore explains their existence 
and properties.’ What Galen offers in the case of organisms is an internal teleology that is 
the result of design. 
 
52 Cf. Cicero De natura deorum 2.37 (SVF 2.1153, Long and Sedley 54H; tr. Long and 
Sedley): ‘As Chrysippus cleverly put it, just as the shield-cover was made for the sake of 
the shield and the sheath for the sake of the sword, so too with the exception of the world 46 
                                                                                                                                                            
everything else was made for the sake of other things: for example, the crops and fruits 
which the earth brings forth were made for the sake of animals, and the animals which it 
brings forth were made for the sake of men (the horse for transport, the ox for ploughing, 
the dog for hunting and guarding).’  
 
53 See Porphyry De abstinentia 3.20.1 (SVF 2.1152, Long and Sedley 54P; tr. Long and 
Sedley): ‘It was certainly a persuasive idea of Chrysippus’ that the gods made us for our 
own and each other’s sakes, and animals for our sake: horses to help us in war, dogs in 
hunting, and leopards, bears and lions to give us practice in courage. As for the pig, that 
most appetizing of delicacies, it was created for no other purpose than slaughter, and god, 
in furnishing our cuisine, mixed soul in with its flesh like salt.’  
 
54 Cf. De semine 1.15, 132.16-19 De Lacy, 4.581 K, discussing the tension of strings on a 
musical instrument (tr. De Lacy): ‘But let us not suppose that because their tension is useful 
[χρήσιμος] to performers, this state is natural [κατὰ φύσιν] for the cords. The natural 
state [τὸ κατὰ φύσιν] of each thing that exists is not measured by usefulness to us [ταῖς 
ἡμετέραις χρείαις]; for by that reckoning even the death of animals slaughtered for food 
will be natural [κατὰ φύσιν], as they are about to become useful to us.’ 
 
 
55 The only passage I have found where Galen seems to appeal to the chreia of an artifact 
as a whole is UP 17.1, 2.438.2-7 H, 4.347 K, which reads as follows in May’s translation 
(slightly modified): ‘there is no part which we desire for its own sake, and a part deprived 
of its activity would be so superfluous that we should cut it off rather than wish to keep it. 
Indeed, if there were any such part in the body of an animal, we would not say that the 
whole had any certain use [οὐκ ἂν ἁπάντων ἐλέγομεν εἶναί τινα χρείαν]. But since 
neither man nor any other animal has such a part, we say that nature is skillful.’ But the 47 
                                                                                                                                                            
italicized sentence could better be translated ‘we would not say that all the parts had a use’, 
and there is in any case some uncertainty about the reading ἁπάντων (the alternatives 
include both αὐτοῦ and ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ according to Helmreich’s apparatus).  
 
56 Cf. McLaughlin, What Functions Explain, 142-50. 
  
57 See esp. De constitutione artis medicae ad Patrophilum 58.34-60.6 Fortuna, 1.231 K: 
‘Just as the person who wishes to know precisely what sort of thing a house that has already 
come to be is attains knowledge of it from analysis and decomposition, in the same way we 
too will come to know the body of a human being from dissection. Now god and nature 
recognize the parts in advance, like the one who originally constructed the house, since use 
furnishes them with the model [τῆς χρείας αὐτοῖς τὸ παράδειγμα γεννώσης], but we 
[recognize the parts] like one who investigates the house that has already come to be. And 
yet for us too, if we do not make our knowledge as similar as possible to god, it will be 
impossible to recognize whether all [the parts] have come to be on account of some use 
[chreia], or some of them in vain.’  
 
58 Galen’s Demiurge is limited by the nature of the matter he has to work with; in this sense 
he is fundamentally distinct from the Judeo-Christian God, who could ‘make a horse or a 
cow out of ashes’ (UP 11.14, 2.158.23-26 H, 3.906 K).  
 
59 Of course it is presumably the Demiurge who conceives of the various kinds of living 
things, so in this sense the uses of all the parts do ultimately depend on his intentions. But 
once the forms of living organisms have been established (i.e. by specifying the ‘character 
and faculties’ of their souls) the plan of construction follows immediately. The point is that 
even though Galen thinks that organisms, like artifacts, are the result of intelligent design, 48 
                                                                                                                                                            
the teleology of the organism does not depend on the intentions of its designer in the same 
way as the teleology of an artifact. In the case of artifacts, the functions of the parts are 
dependent on the purpose for which the artifact was designed. In the case of organisms, 
which are their own ends, the functions of the parts depend solely on their contributions to 
the whole; the designer is invoked only because matter would never come to possess an 
appropriate level of structural organization if left to its own accord.  
 
60 In De propriis placitis 2, Galen says that the existence of the gods can be inferred from 
their ‘works’ (erga), which include: the ‘construction’ (κατασκευή) of living things; omens, 
portents, and dreams; cures (Galen refers to an occasion on which he was cured by 
Asclepius); and help at sea (Galen claims personal experience of the providence [pronoia] 
and power [dynamis] of the Dioscuri). See the recently rediscovered Greek text as 
presented in V. Boudon-Millot and A. Pietrobelli, ‘Galien ressuscité’. 
 
61 On the heuristic role of teleology in Galen see Hankinson, ‘Galen and the Best of All 
Possible Worlds’, 223-7.  